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INTRODUCTION
The right to join with other people to promote a particular outlook, known as the right of expressive association, is a necessary adjunct to the right of freedom of speech, which is The Supreme Court seemed aghast that the expressive association right, with its origins in the civil rights struggle, had been embraced by those who sought to use it as a shield against antidiscrimination laws. In a series of opinions in the mid to late 1980s, the Court both narrowly defined the circumstances in which expressive association rights are impinged, and suggested that antidiscrimination laws are always "compelling government interests" sufficient to override these rights. Expressive association rights had become a virtual nullity, at least in cases involving competing anti-discrimination claims.
Dale, however, dramatically revived the right of expressive association. The Court found that the Boy Scouts had an expressive association right to exclude gay scoutmasters even though the Scouts' anti-homosexual activity policy was neither well-publicized nor central to its mission. Moreover, the Court rejected New Jersey's claim that the law was justified by the state's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against homosexuals.
The essay will examine the right of expressive association and the consequences of its reinvigoration at the hands of the Supreme Court in Dale. Part I recounts the ups and downs of the right from its inception in civil rights cases almost fifty years ago, to its low ebb following "deterrent effect on the free enjoyment of the right to associate" that compelled disclosure was likely to have.
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Following Patterson, the Court decided several other expressive association cases pitting the associational rights of the NAACP and its members against the obstructionist policies of state governments in the South. 7 In each of these cases, the Court applied strict scrutiny-the highest level of scrutiny the Court gives to regulations, requiring that to pass constitutional muster a regulation must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest-to the asserted state interest involved and resolved the cases in favor of associational rights. contending that the Jaycees' membership rules violated Minnesota's law banning discrimination in public accommodations. 15 The national Jaycees sought relief against the law in federal court, arguing that the law impinged on the right of expressive association. 16 The Jaycees noted that their charter called for the organization to "promote the interests of young men," a presumptively easier task for an organization with an all-male membership than for a mixed-sex organization.
The National Jaycees lost at the district court level, but won on appeal before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 17 The Eighth Circuit held that the national Jaycees had a right to associate as the means to achieve their expressive ends, including the advancement of the interests of young men, and that allowing women as full members would directly burden that right. 18 The Eighth Circuit also found that Minnesota's asserted compelling interest, the prevention of discrimination in places of public accommodation on the basis of sex, was not sufficiently compelling to overcome the national Jaycees' right to expressive association. and two Justices did not participate. Brennan's opinion, while acknowledging a broad right to expressive association, and recognizing that the central purpose of the national Jaycees was the promotion of the interests of young men, held that forcing the organization to admit women as full members would not impact the national Jaycees' right to expressive association. 20 Brennan stated that there was no evidence that the admission of women would substantially impair the organization's promotion of the interests of young men, and that without further evidence he would "decline to indulge in the sexual stereotyping that underlies appellee's contention that, by allowing women to vote, application of the Minnesota Act will change the content or impact of the organization's speech." 21 Brennan added that even if Minnesota's public accommodations law did impinge on expressive association, and the Court therefore had to apply strict scrutiny, the law served Minnesota's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination and ensuring its citizens equal access to publicly available goods and services. Moreover, the law was the law was narrowly tailored because it abridged the National Jaycees' expressive association rights only insofar as it was necessary to accomplish the Act's purpose. 22 Brennan also suggested that discriminatory practices were analogous to "violence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact" and that such activities were "entitled to no constitutional protection". 23 Brennan's opinion in Roberts is significant in two respects. First, Brennan tendentiously interpreted the facts to find that expressive association rights were not impinged. Brennan's assertion that it is merely stereotypical thinking to assume that women as a group are less inclined than young men as a group to desire to promote the interests of young men seems almost laughable. 24 Second, and even more significant, Brennan characterized the Jaycees' discriminatory practices as akin to violence and not worthy of constitutional protection, and therefore gave the right of expressive association short shrift in his compelling interest analysis.
In adopting this argument, the Court sent the message that expressive association was far less important than other First Amendment rights. 25 Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Roberts was far narrower. She recognized that an association's right to define its membership is an important part of the right of expressive association. She nevertheless believed that the Jaycees were not entitled to claim the right because they were primarily a "commercial" association-providing networking contacts to young businesspeople-rather than a primarily expressive one. 26 After the Roberts opinion, the Court rejected two other expressive association challenges to public accommodations laws, and in doing so reinforcing the idea that the right to expressive association was a weak constitutional right at best. 27 In purposes. 28 The Court also applied the same lax version of strict scrutiny it had used in Roberts, finding that any infringement on the right to expressive association was justified by the State's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women. under its own banner. GLIB argued that the privately-sponsored parade was subject to
Massachusetts' public accommodations law, which banned discrimination against homosexuals. 33 The organizers of the parade countered that the admission of GLIB to the parade would violate their right to expressive association by forcing them to convey a sexual message.
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The trial court, following the Roberts methodology, found that any burden on the organizers right to expressive association caused by allowing GLIB to march in the parade was The Court's decision in Hurley seemed to halt the trend away from protection of the right to expressive association, but its implications were somewhat ambiguous. The Hurley opinion was unclear as to whether its holding relied on the right to expressive association or on the right to free speech, and whether there was a meaningful distinction between these two rights.
However, the Court's decision in Dale soon initiated a dramatic change in the legal status of the right to expressive association. Hurley, determining that it had involved "pure forms of speech" rather than expressive association, and that Hurley's reference to expressive association was dicta. 50 The court also followed Roberts's lead by applying a weak version of strict scrutiny and concluding that any infringement was justified by New Jersey's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination.
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The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. 52 The court found that the forced inclusion of
Dale as a member would not significantly affect the ability of the BSA to disseminate its message, because the BSA did not associate to promote the message that homosexuality is immoral. 53 The court invoked Roberts for the proposition that "[s]tate laws against discrimination may take precedence over the right of expressive association because 'acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services and other advantages cause unique evils that the government has a compelling interest to prevent." 54 Finally, the court determined that any infringement on the BSA's right to expressive association was justified by the New Jersey's compelling interest in preventing discrimination. 70 He contends that the crucial distinction the Court will make after Dale in the area of expressive association will be akin to the approach suggested by Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts. The Court will provide Dale's heightened protection to organizations whose activities are primarily expressive, while other groups whose activities are primarily commercial will receive a minimal level of protection. 71 Carpenter contends that this distinction is also somewhat analogous to the Court's treatment of core political and commercial speech. 72 He also argues that this distinction is consistent with the results in both Roberts and Dale because the Jaycees was a primarily commercial organization, while the BSA is primarily expressive. Carpenter concludes that "there is little doubt that a majority of the Court is now following Justice O'Connor's approach to associational freedom," even though Dale did not articulate this explicitly. 73 Other scholars have suggested that Dale does not signal a complete repudiation of the Roberts standard, but is rather an anomaly generated by the parties involved: the venerable institution of the BSA on the one hand, and the homosexual minority and their tenuous social and legal status on the other. 74 In particular, commentators who hold this view argue that the Court's ruling would have been different in a case concerning race or sex discrimination. 75 Some attribute this difference to the Court's majority's lack of sympathy for gay rights, suggesting that the Court believes that eradicating discrimination against African Americans or women, but not gays, is a compelling government interest.
Others have suggested that the source of the distinction between cases involving gays and other expressive associations is the Court's equal protection jurisprudence. For equal protection purposes, the Court engages in strict scrutiny of laws that classify by race (requiring that the classification at issue be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest), intermediate scrutiny of laws that classify by sex (requiring a that the classification serve important government interests and be substantially related to the achievement of that goal), and rational basis scrutiny (requiring merely that a classification be rationally related to a legitimate state interest rest on grounds not wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective) for laws that classify by sexual orientation. Antidiscrimination laws will be protected from expressive association claims under the compelling interest test based on the degree of protection the group facing discrimination receives under equal protection doctrine. It should be noted that scholars who hold such views are speculating, and that there is nothing in Dale that suggests that race discrimination cases would get treated differently than sexual orientation discrimination cases. Quite the contrary, the Court wrote that "public or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization's expression does not justify the State's effort to compel the organization to accept members where such acceptance would derogate from the organization's expressive message." There has, however, been one case decided by the Third Circuit that has some restrictive implications for the right of expressive association. In Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v.
University of Pittsburgh, 82 a fraternity that had been stripped of its status as a recognized student organization following a drug raid raised the right of expressive association in a lawsuit against the university. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, not surprisingly, rejected the fraternity's claim. 83 However, as part of its analysis, the court determined that the fraternity was not engaged in expressive activity sufficient to qualify for First Amendment protection. 84 In reaching this conclusion, the court engaged in an extensive analysis of the fraternity chapter's activities, finding that it did nothing to perpetuate what the purported associational ideals of the national fraternity. 85 The court held that the chapter was therefore not engaged in expressive activity.
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The court added that even if the fraternity was engaged in expressive activity, the University's conduct did not significantly infringe upon it.
87
Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' ultimate conclusion that the University's actions did not infringe on the fraternity's right of expressive association is correct, the court's determination that the fraternity was not engaged in expressive activity is belied by Dale. First, Much of the potential of the right of expressive association, however, remains untapped.
In particular, as interpreted by Dale, the right of expressive association has great possibilities for use by religious organizations and private universities faced with antidiscrimination laws that would interfere with their ability to promote their ideologies. Expressive association may also ultimately protect the affirmative action policies of private universities from government intrusion.
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Id. The New Jersey public accommodations law involved prohibited, inter alia, discrimination in privileges of any place of public accommodation due to sexual orientation. 
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Id. at 288. As a part of this analysis, the court expressed skepticism regarding whether the BSA's policy against homosexual members was in fact a public position taken by the organization. The court noted that, according to BSA rules and bylaws, the only membership requirements were age, gender, and willingness to adhere to the Scout Law and Scout Oath. The court also noted that, although the BSA had contended that its policy was that the requirements in the Scout Law and Oath that a scout be "morally straight" and "clean" prohibited homosexuality, the policy was of fairly recent vintage and had not been widely disseminated. 
